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Abstract
In this article, we argue for the importance of the notion of conflict in John Dewey’s 
philosophy. Indeed, many criticisms have been leveled against Dewey regarding 
his political philosophy and his philosophy of education based on the idea that he 
underestimated the conflict inherent in human affairs. These criticisms are com-
pelling because they link the two sides—educational and political—of Dewey’s 
philosophy. Critics simultaneously address their criticisms to one side vis-à-vis the 
adverse consequences caused as a result of the other side. In response to this analy-
sis, we want to argue that conflict is indispensable for understanding the theory 
of inquiry and its validity in the search for knowledge as well as in confronting 
social and political tensions. In this way, we will first see the criticisms of Dewey’s 
lack of emphasis on the notion of conflict in his philosophy. Then we will see how, 
in response to these criticisms, it is possible to determine three uses of conflict in 
Dewey’s work. Finally, we will turn to the role that this notion can play in devel-
oping a pedagogy of compromise based on Dewey’s educational philosophy. Thus, 
we hope to respond to criticisms of Dewey’s work without discarding either side—
educational or political—of his theorizing.
Introduction
The reception of Dewey’s work has suffered, in terms of his political philosophy, 
from a certain mistrust. First, in the field of education, Dewey’s refusal to grant 
“ultimate” or “high” status to certain values, even those of the French Republic, 
has made him a mistrusted figure.1 Apart from the pedagogues of Education Nou-
velle, which defied the then dominant “Cartesian tradition of the dualistic phi-
losophy of reason” in France, Dewey was little studied before the 1960s. In 2013, 
Kambouchner perceived an opposition between Dewey and Durkheim;2 however, 
the French reception of The Public and Its Problems in 1927 also suffered from 
suspicion and skepticism.3 To begin, there was suspicion with regard to this philo-
sophical approach, which has always stood somewhat in opposition to Marxism, 
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then the main European intellectual opposition force on the left, because Dewey’s 
approach negated many of Marxism’s observations and concepts.4 However, there 
was also skepticism about the theoretical basis of democracy, in which prosperity 
and serenity often appear superficially.
In this context, it seems that individuals will mutually recognize the prob-
lems they have in common and begin to inquire together as to how to resolve 
them. Indeed, in The Public and Its Problems, it appears that the question of self- 
recognition by the public is necessary and resolved by a quasi-magic process in which 
the interactions of citizens gradually lead them to institutionalize legitimate officers 
for all concerned. There are many words to describe this process: “convergence,” “har-
mony,” a “qualitatively unified situation,” “recherche interpersonnelle du commun,” 
and so on. Yet it is with regard to this idea of mutual recognition and resolution that 
Dewey’s political pragmatism seems to be most fragile,5 and one can question whether 
Dewey does not consciously rule out the importance of conflict in public education. 
The risk is that if there is a disagreement between stakeholders due to the difference in 
the interests of each, then this can impede or even completely inhibit any special inves-
tigations. In this case, refusing to accept conflict as a dynamic political tool forces the 
public and critics to think of a democracy that is blind to strikes, blocked situations, 
social confrontations, in short, of the violence of those who do not want compromise.
In response to these accusatory questions, we can only ask ourselves in what 
sense Dewey sees conflict as a “gadfly of thought,” and whether it really has its place 
in the education of the public.6 
However, the conflict, understood as the violent opposition of two oppos-
ing parties, preoccupied young Dewey’s mind. A discussion with Jane Addams, 
recounted in John Dewey’s correspondence with Alice Chipman Dewey (October 
10, 1894), may give us an idea of the extent of this problem. It was in June 1894 when 
125,000 railway workers went on strike against the Pullman Company, whose direc-
tor, George Pullman, had decreased the workers’ wages and refused to discuss this 
reduction with the unions. At that time, Dewey had just moved to Chicago and in 
the role of a “social practicing scientist,”7 he saw this social movement as an oppor-
tunity “to get the social organization thinking.”8 On the Fourth of July, Dewey met 
with strikers and sympathized with their leader, Eugene Debs. Furthermore, con-
fronted with the hostility and misunderstanding toward the workers on the part 
of the government, Dewey admitted that he had “a good deal of [the] anarchist” 
in him.9 For more than a month this strike was marked by violence on both sides, 
with some bosses employing African American workers to break the strike and oth-
ers burning company buildings and derailing a locomotive.10 The strike ended in a 
bloodbath: 12,000 U.S. Army soldiers killed 13 strikers and wounded another 57.
Like many democratic intellectuals of his time, Dewey could not reconcile 
with himself this use of force by the state, especially since it takes the form of an 
act that, if not legitimate, seems necessary for the restoration of order. Dewey sees 
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this antagonism between Pullman’s bosses and workers as a failure of democracy 
that damages the efforts of moderate liberals, particularly those at Hull House, 
both socially and politically. The resolution of the conflict through violence seems 
to him to be politically unavoidable and yet it is contrary to his democratic ideals.
But Jane Addams, who also deplored this incident, did not give up and would 
even “interiorly convert” John Dewey to a democratic ideal that would always search 
to overcome the conflict in the compromise.11 For this she would use a biblical meta-
phor: that of Jesus driving the merchants out of the temple of Jerusalem, offended 
and angry at those who profane this sacred place through their commercial activi-
ties. For Addams, Jesus failed in this place. The use of this violence is not a con-
viction but the thoughtless reaction of a man who is still only a man. Thus, even if 
Christ himself is confronted with conflict, his reaction is still useless and danger-
ous. The conflict, for Addams, does not make it possible to add to the recognition 
of the common good, and, on the contrary, delays and distorts it.12 Or, according to 
Louis Ménand, “antagonism (as she [Jane Addams] had tried to explain to Dewey) 
was only misunderstanding, a tension in the progress toward a common outcome.”13
Impressed by his friend’s conviction regarding the true nature of the aforemen-
tioned biblical story, Dewey would “have to give it all up and start over again” in terms 
of his reflections on the role of conflict within his theory of democracy.14 The task is 
not simple, for it is necessary neither to deny the existence of conflict within political 
reality nor to keep at a distance the normative force that Marxist theory wants to con-
fer on it. Thus, Dewey seeks to draw a middle path between pacifists and warmongers. 
To do so, he must first respond to the criticisms of Reinhold Niebuhr made during his 
time. We will complement these criticisms with more recent ones from Aaron Schutz 
to broaden the scope of the reflection. Next, Dewey must revise his Hegelian reading 
of conflict to propose a new dialectical conception that would account theoretically for 
Jane Addams’s faith. Thus, it is important to see how Dewey’s criticisms allowed him 
to clarify his idea of the value of conflict, particularly in his philosophy of education, 
where Dewey goes so far as to construct a “pedagogy of compromise,” conscious of con-
flict and making it an element of the reconstruction process promoted by pragmatism.
In this way, the criticisms of Dewey’s failure to fully acknowledge the impor-
tance of the notion of conflict in his philosophy becomes more intelligible. Subse-
quently, we will see how, in response to these criticisms, it is possible to determine 
three uses of conflict in Dewey’s work. Finally, it is the role that the notion of conflict 
can play in this pedagogy of compromise, based on Dewey’s education philosophy, 
that will be the focus of our attention.
I/ Criticism by Niebuhr and Schutz
Although there are many criticisms of Dewey on this issue, two of them are par-
ticularly effective, though they actually make the same point, which is the lack of 
importance of conflict in Dewey’s thinking. The first, by Reinhold Niebuhr, is a 
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critique made during Dewey’s lifetime and focuses on practical ineffectiveness in 
politics. The second, more recent attack is that of Aaron Schutz, where Dewey is 
criticized because of the political danger that his pedagogy allegedly forgets the 
notion of conflict. Thus, Dewey’s theory is criticized for eluding the notion of con-
flict both in and through political practice and pedagogy.
1/ Rienhold Niebuhr’s Criticism 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s critique of Dewey’s political philosophy is straightforward. 
In his 1932 work, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, 
Niebuhr argues that Dewey gives too much power to the role of education and thus 
deludes himself regarding the power of social transformation. These seem to be, 
according to Niebuhr, “middle-class prejudices” that mask conflicts of interest in 
any form of political ideology.15 He implies here, according to Marxist thought, that 
the middle class to which Dewey belongs is deluding itself on the nature of politics 
because it is the class that has the most to lose in a conflict that would force it to take 
sides in favor of the dominant or the dominated. The consequence of this denial of 
conflict as a political tool is only to use reforms that rely on social transformation 
without a balance of forces as political strategy, thus opposing the revolution (which 
is an expression and reversal of this balance of forces). On the contrary, Niebuhr 
argues for the existence of this balance of forces and the need to address the con-
flict, even if it means triggering a civil war, in order to overcome the domination it 
expresses. Niebuhr uses the recent historical example of the American Civil War, 
which led to the abolition of slavery, to justify this theory historically. 
Thus, for Niebuhr, a theoretical insufficiency renders Dewey’s theory of 
democracy profoundly inefficient and impractical: “Conflict is inevitable, and in this 
conflict power must be challenged by power. That fact is not recognized by most of 
the educators, and only very grudgingly admitted by most of the social scientists.”16 
The central point of Niebuhr’s argument is that Dewey misunderstands the notion 
of conflict because he axiologically opposes “intelligence” to “force” and refuses to 
use the latter. Niebuhr argues that Dewey is the victim of a “scientist” illusion.17 In 
this type of illusion, the scientific method employed in physics or biology is effec-
tive because it highlights human progress in the control of natural phenomena 
obtained through this method. If this is true historically for the application of this 
method in the pure sciences, it is wrong for Dewey to place such hope and faith in 
its application in the social and political fields.
Without revisiting the opposition between faith and reason that Niebuhr 
advances18 and that Dewey disputes, it is understandable that Niebuhr criticizes 
the “faith” that Dewey puts into scientific reasoning. Niebuhr argues that science 
is not outside the realm of politics, and therefore it is naive to think that science 
can escape political conflicts of interest. Scientific techniques will be appropriated 
by the powerful of this world before serving the marginalized. If the experimental 
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method advocated by Dewey in the service of a social agenda could so easily suc-
ceed in supporting science against religious traditionalism, this will not be the 
case in the field of politics, which is subject to conflicts between different interests.
Denying Dewey the right to oppose force with intelligence constitutes the first 
step of Niebuhr’s criticism. Indeed, he challenges the idea that science, by sweep-
ing away the diversity of interests involved, can solve all political problems in the 
same way as it can for technical problems. Class interests conditioned the “method 
of intelligence” advocated by Dewey.19 This criticism allowed Niebuhr, engaged in 
defending workers’ rights, to disqualify Dewey in 1933 and 1934 as a defender of the 
oppressed by declaring him incapable, theoretically and practically, of taking over 
the political conflict. Thus, for Niebuhr, this denial of conflict in Dewey’s political 
philosophy leads to practical ineffectiveness in politics. This first critique attacks 
Dewey in terms of his political philosophy.
2/ Aaron Schutz’s Criticism 
Moreover, Niebuhr’s criticism is not isolated. On the contrary, Schutz’s argument 
further develops Niebuhr’s critiques. Indeed, it is not the fact that Dewey’s non-
conflictual theory of democracy is ineffective in its practice, but rather that such a 
theory is a “dangerous fantasy” with regard to his pedagogy.20
Without summarizing Schutz’s entire analysis, let us simply observe that he 
examines progressive democrats’ conviction for social transformation through edu-
cation and the limits of this conviction. By comparing the political theory of these 
democrats, of which Dewey is a member, with that of the more militant theory of 
Saul Alinsky, Schutz finds that the educational philosophy of democrats does not 
take into account the notion of conflict for ideological reasons. Education pro-
moted by progressive democrats focuses on interaction in small groups, fostered 
in an egalitarian framework that promotes individual expression. This pedagogy 
promotion of a peer-to-peer relationship does not allow for the expanded solidar-
ity that is essential to the workers’ or trade unions’ movements that goes beyond 
this relationship. 
However, by failing to prepare students for this conflict during their educa-
tional development, these teachers leave their students at a loss, once they become 
adults, in the face of often conflicting political problems. Indeed, at the heart of 
the Chicago Laboratory School, founded by Dewey, there is a greater emphasis 
on cooperation and sharing among students. Moreover, the social dialogue in 
this context inadequately prepares privileged students for the violence of disputes 
between adults. These children are not aware of their privilege because they have 
never experienced an interaction with those who are less privileged than they are, 
so they are not really capable of preparing for future political conflicts. The defini-
tive remark on the subject goes to Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp 
Edwards when they note that “society brings both shock and conflict to a young 
person [. . .] trained [to collaborate]. . . . His attempts to use intelligent action for 
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social purposes are thwarted and balked by the competitive antisocial spirit and 
dominant selfishness in society as it is.”21
But Schutz’s argument is more precise than simply a critique of Dewey’s edu-
cational philosophy. According to Schutz, the analogy Dewey makes between the 
organization of the public in a controlled and peaceful classroom and the organi-
zation of the public in an adult political conflict does not apply because it ignores 
the reality of power within human political interactions.22 The so-called “balance 
of forces” or “reality of power” indicates the influence and importance of personal 
interests on the construction of a common interest. Schutz does not mean that the 
common interest is a political fiction reassuring the middle class, but it is clear from 
his criticisms that basing public education only on the slow construction of this 
common interest is overly idealistic. This last adjective is clearly pejorative and syn-
onymous with failure and disillusionment for those citizens raised by democratic 
educators. Without experiencing a confrontation with power relations, the peda-
gogical resources of pragmatic education will only have a limited political impact 
on the social and democratic transformation that they advocate.
Schutz’s criticism is effective for at least three reasons. First, it has a broad 
scope in considering the two political and pedagogical sides of Dewey’s work. Here 
pedagogues cannot come to the rescue of political philosophers, and vice versa, to 
defend Dewey’s theory of democracy. Advocating for conflict-free education for a 
future society without conflict cannot be effective in a society where preexisting 
conflicts exist. Second, Schutz’s criticism is based on a conceptual study internal 
to Dewey’s work where the notion of power, which explains the conflict of particu-
lar interests, is hardly present. Finally, Schutz’s criticism resonates with a certain 
historical reality in which the progressive democrats failed to achieve political 
power in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century by rallying poor 
or racialized minorities to strive to overcome their social struggles. The history of 
the United States during this second half of the nineteenth century can be read as 
a continuation of the failure of the Democratic Party to establish a significant bal-
ance of power before their negotiations with industry employers.23
For Schutz, for example, this lack of attention to conflict in Dewey’s philoso-
phy of education results in a misplaced political hope in his pedagogy. This second 
critique, based on his philosophy of education, complements the first critique, which 
is more oriented toward Dewey’s political philosophy and covers the whole field of 
his thinking on this issue.
In light of these criticisms, the most effective avenue of response is still to 
make it clear what the role of conflict is in Dewey’s theory. Indeed, two elements 
demonstrate that Dewey is aware of the denunciations he has received regarding this 
point. First, there is the April 25, 1934, article in the New Republic entitled “Intel-
ligence and Power.”24 This is a direct response to Niebuhr, who is quoted therein. 
Second, Dewey’s correspondence clarifies his irritation with these criticisms. For 
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example, he wrote in 1946 to Joseph Ratner that “[Raphael] Demos in a recent 
review, Yale Review, speaks of my ‘rosy harmonies’ and my ‘denial of essential 
disharmonies and conflicts’” (October 11, 1946).25 In his responses to these criti-
cisms, Dewey gives a place to the notion of conflict, which can be divided into three 
points: (1) conflict plays a role in the formation of the public as class struggle, (2) 
conflict is an indispensable dimension of thought because it triggers the problem 
that is at the heart of any inquiry, and (3) conflict is necessary for the construction 
of a creative compromise, in particular for the deliberation of values. Let us study 
each of these individual roles given to the notion of conflict.
II/ What Is the Use of Conflict in Dewey’s Theory?
Against these readings of Reinhold Niebuhr and Aaron Schutz, we want to argue 
that conflict is indispensable within the theory of democratic inquiry. Indeed, in 
order to understand this theory of inquiry and its validity in the search for knowl-
edge, as well as for challenging social and political confrontations, conflict cannot 
be ignored, as Dewey recognizes its necessity in the context of public education. 
In addition, the natural presence of conflict is perceived through a Hegelian lens 
as a moment or a tool of the investigative method. Finally, in terms of Dewey’s 
democratic project, this method explains the essential presence of conflict within 
political confrontations.
1/ Is Conflict Essential for Public Training?
To answer this question, the first reasonable thing to say is that Dewey does not at 
any time challenge the idea of class struggle in human history. A close reading of 
Democracy and Education shows that this idea is present in the structure of society 
that education might be seen to transform.
In Chapters 19 to 26, we observe an analysis that divides society into two 
classes and from this division emerges many dualisms marking education. The 
ruling classes oppose the lower classes, creating subclasses of employers between 
employees. These, in turn, create an educated class and an uneducated class, which 
then creates an opposition between leisure classes and working classes, and so on. 
Dewey points out the exploitation of power relations everywhere and sees this as a 
powerful obstacle to the advent of democracy through transformative education. 
Indeed, the opposition of particular interests produces more of an immobilism or 
deterioration of the situation (political, economic, etc.) than an intelligent evolu-
tion of the situation. But if the analysis of this class struggle were subtler in Dewey’s 
work than in that of Marx, it is not as neglected as Niebuhr would have us believe.
In particular, in The Public and Its Problems, class struggle creates an oppres-
sive environment, which must be distinguished from the growing industrialization 
process of the nineteenth century.26 But where Dewey goes further than Marx is by 
adopting in part a Spencerian reading of human history; Dewey sees conflict as a 
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constant in the evolution of human societies. At every stage of humanity, conflicts 
have fueled technological, scientific, and cultural changes in different societies. 
From early confrontations between hunter-gatherers and early farmers, to the les-
sons of the First World War, Dewey says that “Everywhere in life there is conflict 
of the old and traditional with the new, and resultant confusion. This conflict is 
nowhere more acute than in education, and nowhere are the consequences of con-
fusion more harmful.”27 This conflict is a driving force for progress because it calls 
on societies to organize themselves to resolve it. In this sense, conflict has a role 
in shaping the public. It is an essential element of the public’s recognition of itself 
and of forming against and developing animosity toward other publics. Recogniz-
ing the fact that someone can have common interests with other individuals is not 
easy, and recognizing that those interests are sometimes opposed to the interests 
of other individuals can help a person identify those with whom he or she can 
associate. Conflict with a given public would then be what would allow that pub-
lic to form itself. In this sense, Dewey responds to Schutz’s criticism because the 
latter affirms the educational significance of the conflict, and thus its pedagogical 
importance. However, conflict remains a limited tool; it confines the pooling of 
special interests to a level where an “opposing” audience is necessary for the for-
mation of “my” public.
The assertion of this argument has an important consequence: for Dewey, 
to advocate for an experimental and pragmatic policy does not mean to deny the 
conflict between the interests of the different classes; on the contrary, it means that 
the interests of the dominated classes must drive social change. The dominant class 
is necessarily the one that has the greatest interest in maintaining the legacy of the 
past, which is considered indispensable. It will resist what appears to be new, that 
is. any ideology that does not advance the situation in the direction of a new com-
mon interest, different from its first established interest. Thus, if an elite class, a 
powerful minority, possesses the majority of the means of production and refuses 
to change social organization in favor of all (for example, by increasing salaries at 
a time when the cost of living is also rising), it is, according to Dewey, legitimate 
to use force against it: “A minority refuses by force to permit the method of intel-
ligent action to go into effect. Then force may be intelligently employed to subdue 
and disarm the recalcitrant minority.”28 
The intelligent use of force reveals the importance of the notion of conflict but 
also circumscribes it.29 What Dewey wants to underline, to respond to the dualism 
that Niebuhr wants him to endorse between strength and intelligence, is that under 
no circumstances is violent and armed struggle absolutely necessary according to any 
historical dogmatism. Violent struggle is a possibility, but not an ontological neces-
sity. The conflict, as we shall see later on, loses its value when it is resolved in violence. 
This violence has the effect of “freezing” the public in its interests and preventing 
it from associating with other publics. On the other hand, intelligence assures the 
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“plasticity” of audiences, allowing them to associate themselves with the interests of 
other publics. Thus, the promise of progress that lies in conflict is the correlate of its 
power to educate the public, but on the sine qua non condition of intelligent action 
by the public in its asserting its claims. The fruitfulness of conflict is therefore mea-
sured by the intelligence of the stakeholders involved and how they understand it.
2/ Engagement with Conflict as an Indispensable Tool  
for Dialectical Thought
The secondary status that Dewey gives to the notion of conflict explains the relation-
ship that our first response indicates between intelligence and conflict. Indeed, in 
order to answer this last question, we must take a step back from Dewey’s political 
theory and return to his theory of knowledge, because it is also within this theory 
that Dewey will give an indispensable place to the notion of conflict.
To be clear, in his Logic Dewey will propose a reconstruction of psychology 
that associates the logic of inquiry with the very process of thought. This process 
then finds its point of emergence in problematic situations. That is, what explains 
the emergence of thought within a subject is primarily the existence of a conflict 
between the subject and his or her environment. This original conflict will turn 
Dewey’s logic into a way of thinking about the elimination of this conflict, that is, 
the construction and resolution of the Problem it generates.
In addition, the Hegelian origin of this notion is worth mentioning in terms 
of overcoming the conflict. Mead and then Thayer formulated for the first time a 
hypothesis, inspired by Hegel’s work, doubly justifying the interactionism of the 
logic of inquiry and the design of the Problem:30
For Dewey the process of inquiry does not issue in some universal state of 
consciousness and truth. A specific problem generates and determines the 
course of thought and circumscribes its conclusions (. . .) nonetheless (. . .) 
each individual inquiry is like a little Hegelian universe; an evolutionary 
struggle of consciousness against ‘otherness’ proceeding through moments 
and ‘forms’ (Gestalten) to a unified concrete whole, self-realization and 
truth; thought mediating existence.31 
Here Thayer points out the fact that the objects that constitute the material 
of inquiry do not appear freely or randomly to the inquirers’ conscience. On the 
contrary, their emergence is coordinated by the Problem or “difficulty” to which 
the subject is exposed. The Problem is therefore not only what feeds the inquiry, but 
also what triggers it, and in this way it engages the subject in a dialectic between 
him or her and his or her environment. The conflict between the subject and his or 
her environment can take many forms, from hunger and thirst to the artist’s inti-
mate need to express what he or she feels in a complex personal situation.32 This is 
what Thayer suggests to all evolutionary mental processes, whether they belong to 
the realm of science, nature, history, or social interaction.
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It is in this way that Dewey traces the evolution of Hegel’s thought in his 
course on the Philosophy of the Spirit of 1897. Dewey makes the concept of the Prob-
lem a central facet of Hegelian philosophy in three ways. First of all, the starting 
point of his philosophy, the relationship between unity and diversity, is a problem: 
“His original problem” was the driving force behind all of his work.33 For Dewey, 
Hegel’s philosophical production is the first proof of the importance of the Prob-
lem in thought. Second, the importance of the Problem is not specific to Hegel’s 
mind; indeed Kant, Fichte, and Schelling were all motivated in their philosophical 
productions by the resolution of a Problem, a “resistance,” a contradiction.34 The 
Problem is therefore what causes all subsequent human thoughts. Finally, Dewey’s 
overview of dialectics creates a conceptual role that is specific to the Problem itself. 
How else can scholars explain the articulation of the idea that a “spirit is absolute 
unrest,”35 is always interested (“we attend only to that which interests us”),36 is a 
desire that causes consciousness,37 and finally is a “process of restoration”?38 The 
conflict at the heart of the Problem is also what triggers both the work of the mind, 
the dialectical process, and the emergence of consciousness. It should also be noted 
that if the Problem is at the origin of the inquiry and the theory of knowledge, and 
if this theory must be totally coherent, then the purpose of thought is to solve the 
Problem being encountered so that the subject thinks in order to no longer think.39 
Dewey also noted this point in 1897 when he studied Hegel’s philosophy of spirit: 
“suppression of thought is the fundamental principle of thinking.”40 
Thus, in making the thought process of the Problem central to his Logic, 
Dewey places conflict at the center of creative thinking. Indeed, overcoming 
Problems means a “positive” resolution of the conflict, which is neither a destruc-
tion of the environment nor a total alienation of the subject. On the contrary, 
the intelligence promoted by this first hypothesis is what determines the quality 
of the subject’s adaptation to his or her conflict. Intelligence, understood here as 
the degree of creative adaptation of the individual to his or her environment, can 
also be understood on a collective and social dimension. The conflict will no longer 
reside between a subject and an environment, but between several individuals and 
publics. The question, then, is, can the individual problematic inquiry schema be 
transposed to that of the social inquiry proposed by Dewey?
3/ The Fertility of a Conflict within Social Struggles
Now that we have identified the role of conflict in individual inquiry, we can ques-
tion the relevance of a transposition of conflict for social struggles. This interroga-
tion is not in vain, and Dewey himself is well aware of it: ‘‘the Hegelian emphasis 
upon continuity and the function of conflict after my earlier confidence in dialectic 
had given way to skepticism.’’41 
The implication of the previous answer is that the quality of the Problem to 
be solved by the individuals conducting asocial inquiry depends on their attitude 
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toward the conflict in question. The importance of conflict in a disagreeable situa-
tion would then be what constitutes its problematicity, that is, the degree of complex-
ity necessary for an “organized, intelligent” attitude to resolve it.42 This observation 
is what emerges from the conferences of 1935, synthesized three years later in the 
book Liberalism and Social Action. Thus, it will depend on Dewey’s 1939 work, com-
piled under the title Theory of Valuation, to continue this reflection in the field of 
ethics. Thus, Dewey responds to Niebuhr’s criticism because working through the 
conflict via inquiry does not “guarantee” anything for Dewey, contrary to Niebuhr’s 
assertion, but it offers an opportunity to build a mutually beneficial compromise. 
The compromise is therefore not a scientific ideal for Dewey, but rather a result to 
be researched together.
Conflict will become a necessary dynamic for individual ethical deliberation. 
This method focuses on the values that will condition the choice of hypotheses for 
solving the Problem. The compromise that is supposed to emerge from such delib-
eration would then depend on the attitude toward the conflict between stakeholders. 
Thus conflict is necessary for the construction of a creative compromise, in par-
ticular for the deliberation of values. This gives conflict a positive status as a spark 
for the evaluation process. If the protagonists’ state of emotional and lived conflict 
is rather negative, it is by “the institution of ends and values” that can eradicate 
the conditions that generate conflict.43 This will then allow its positivity to emerge.
Therefore, compromise cannot really be established by force. On the contrary, 
such a resolution would only assert preexisting domination or return to it. Thus the 
justification of violence is complex and requires, precisely, a mobilization of par-
ticular intelligence.44 The intelligence of conflict resolution that deliberation must 
address is the ability of stakeholders to establish common interests, not to triumph 
over one of the two competing interests. This means that the compromise builds a 
common interest, which is not naturally preexisting, but which is produced during 
the conflict. Thus compromise is defined by this intelligent search for the common 
interest beyond particular interests. Without conflict, individuals would not be 
able to perceive the benefit of the common interest over particular interests. This 
production then requires techniques that can be described as democratic. It is in 
this sense that we can hear Dewey’s invitation in his essay “Creative Democracy” to 
think of democracy as an opportunity for pedagogical knowledge about conflict.45
III/ The Fundamental Role of Conflict  
in Education Theory
Having observed the political side of Dewey’s thought processes, we must now study 
the educational side in order to have a global perspective on Dewey’s response to 
his critics. Here, too, conflict has an essential role because it is an indispensable 
component of an educational system that should seek to train the student in the 
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use of real democratic skills. It is through conflict that students can understand 
and learn the essential qualities for engaging in discussions and cooperation. This 
is why a pedagogy of compromise that does not avoid conflict but instead places 
conflict at the core of its educational practices would be indispensable for Dewey’s 
school of tomorrow.
1/ A Core Element of Democratic Education
From the “Creative Democracy” speech, one quotation can provide clues about 
the need for conflict pedagogy within John Dewey’s political and general theory 
of democracy: 
A genuinely democratic faith in peace is faith in the possibility of conduct-
ing disputes, controversies and conflicts as cooperative undertakings in 
which both parties learn by giving the other a chance to express itself.46 
The importance of consensus, cooperation, even brotherhood in Dewey’s 
philosophy of education has often been highlighted, but rarely regarding the need 
for conflict between students, between students and teachers, or between teach-
ers, within this pedagogy. However, if Niebuhr’s or Schutz’s criticisms of the fail-
ures of Dewey’s pedagogy are to be answered in a practical way, this element must 
not be overlooked. The civic education that the school can provide to students is a 
process in which students must experience the conflict. Constructing and super-
vising the conflict then requires that a pedagogical framework should be overseen 
by the teacher where “disputes” and “controversies” can emerge between students. 
In Dewey’s book Democracy and Education, the traditional school is subjected 
to a subtle but continuous line of criticism, which consists in reproaching its lack 
of consideration for the conflict. Indeed, a monolithic truth suppresses any desire of 
opportunity to open up a discussion. A sovereign and immutable authority, embodied 
by the State or the figure of the “master,” prevents any reconsideration of its power and 
possible antagonistic orientations. Moreover, the choice to adopt only one method of 
work or study in a given discipline discourages any possible conflict between students 
and the scientific approach in question. Finally, even more radically, Dewey criticizes 
traditional education for valuing competition between students that undermines con-
flict. Indeed, by creating an axiological asymmetry between the “good” and “bad” 
students, this type of education prevents the “bad” students from contradicting or 
starting an argument with the “good” students because they will feel inferior and 
unworthy of this “transaction” before it even begins. Thus, it is not surprising that 
the social order reproduced by this type of education makes it difficult for creative 
conflict between the oppressed classes and the oppressing classes to occur, and almost 
obliges the conflict to be reduced to violent interactions.
To respond to this lack of conflict, which imposes a preexisting order rather 
than building a “common” one, Dewey wants to think of the production of conflict 
within his pedagogy. The former should not owe anything to chance improvisation 
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or artificial systematization, but is included within the “method of intelligence” 
that is scientific and collective inquiry. Thus, “to claim that intelligence is a better 
method than its alternatives, authority, imitation, caprice and ignorance, prejudice 
and passion, is hardly an excessive claim.”47
In this way, teaching the ability to successfully lead a conflict requires two 
groups of bad habits of interaction to emerge from the discussion. The first group, 
“authority, imitation, caprice,” denies the existence of conflict as a source of mean-
ing. The authorities see the conflict as nothing more than a phenomenon of disor-
der and insubordination that must be suppressed as soon as possible. Imitation as 
a factor of education excludes the conflict, which criticizes the proposed “model” 
and prefers fascination without criticism of the imitated model. Finally, caprice 
denies the productivity of conflict because, while it is necessarily an intersubjective 
social construct, caprice remains a solitary and unjustifiable choice for others. The 
second group, “ignorance, prejudice and passion,” on the other hand, includes all 
the teaching postures that are content with conflict without seeking to overcome it 
in the production of common interests. In fact, ignorance a priori prevents a group 
from leading a conflict to its resolution because it does not maintain a dynamic with 
knowledge acquisition in a given domain. Prejudices also confine themselves to a 
conflict between different preexisting positions and do not pretend to emerge from 
this sterile conflict. Finally, passion is also satisfied with a conflict, often leading to 
violence or, at the very least, an end to the exchange of arguments that can fuel the 
conflict. If there are too many emotion-based arguments present in a conflict, then 
the pursuit of the common good tends to be neglected. In fact, Addams confirmed 
this when she wrote to John Dewey on October 9, 1894,
Antagonism never lies in the objective differences, which always grow into 
unity if left alone, but arises when a person mixes into reality his own per-
sonal reactions. [. . .] When one gives extra emphasis to a part of the truth, 
[. . .] or when one feels that he must prove he is not a moral coward, and 
in a number of other ways, then emotion, not reality, produces conflict.48 
Thus, if democracy is based on the conviction that common problems are 
best solved together rather than individually, it cannot be effective without the need 
to research the common interest in solving the problems in question. The task of 
the school is not to advocate a preexisting, nonconflictual state (often supported 
by a questionable metaphysical or religious order) or a conflictual state that is also 
preexisting and unassailable (whose justification is as doubtful as it is heraclitean), 
but to make the conflict a tool so that the child can conceive the necessity of over-
coming it through discussion. Therefore, Dewey cannot consciously exclude the 
importance of conflict in public education. On the contrary, the child must learn 
the value of conflict from a search for a common good in compromise. Or to put 
it in Jane Addams’s words,
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That the good must be extended to all of society before it can be held secure 
by any one person or any one class; but we have not yet learned to add to 
that statement, that unless all men and all classes contribute to a good, we 
cannot even be sure that it is worth having.49 
2/ A Pedagogy Based on Conflict and in Favor of Compromise
How can groups apply Dewey’s theoretical considerations in practice and make 
conflict a pedagogical element? Long before Célestin Freinet, Paulo Freire, or Fer-
dinand Oury, or more recently Galichet,50 Forestal,51 and Lefranc52 within Fran-
cophone reflections on national education, Dewey described this pedagogy of 
compromise within his theory of education. For him, it is a question of including 
conflict in the experimental and scientific approaches to learning. Conflict is an 
essential link between the experimental and social aspects of this process. Several 
masters and students have carried out the social inquiry that defines this process, 
and, scientifically, its hypotheses are as much a test as an opportunity for conflict 
about their choices. Or, to put it differently, conflict is precisely what prevents the 
method of inquiry from being automatic or a mere mechanical technique.
There are three essential elements for this pedagogy: (1) the teacher must 
transmit to his students the conviction that the conflict can be overcome; (2) this 
overcoming is of greater common interest than all existing private interests; and 
(3) each object with a private interest for several students is therefore subject to a 
conflict and a resolution. These three convictions are not easy to transmit, and in 
the moment teachers often prefer to transmit the conviction to students that cer-
tain things (scientific truths, natural laws, internal rules) are not “discussed.” Or 
that “common interests” in certain fields such as politics, art, or religion are only 
the result of a vast conspiracy from a few dominant parties acting in the shadows. 
Moreover, the social homogeneity of some schools can create privileged environ-
ments where children remain unconscious of their privileges and, in the end, are 
unable to understand a peaceful conflict with less privileged people.
Nevertheless, we can propose here some didactic-related suggestions to con-
cretely implement such a pedagogy. First, in the continuous logic of Dewey’s edu-
cation, this pedagogy would have to be adopted by means of specific didactics for 
each age group of students. For instance, a theoretical conflict could arise due to a 
choice made among several training sessions proposed by the gymnastics teacher 
for primary school students. In this way, the students would experience a conflict 
in concrete terms, but also within a framework secured by the adult authority of the 
gymnastics teacher. At the secondary school level, a biology teacher could give up 
the only explanation of man’s appearance on Earth to confront several theories and 
open a debate on the merits of these hypotheses. This would be an opportunity to 
apply Deweyan inquiry to illustrate that several solutions to a problem are possible 
and that conflict between these hypotheses can be a source of reflections beyond 
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it. Thus, a certain pluralism of possibilities would be understood even within the 
disciplines that seem to be the most “exact.” At the end of high school, a delibera-
tion on the importance of religion could start a course in moral and civic education. 
Again, this would be an opportunity to engage in a values conflict that highlights 
the social and cultural differences of students. The conflict would then have a cre-
ative dimension of transcending privileges depending on the history of a culture in a 
given country. Finally, in higher education, the university’s disputatio could inspire 
many pedagogical ways to benefit from a more lively interaction with students in a 
lecture. Conflicts both identify the differences in each student’s interests and provide 
a framework within which a community could develop. All these suggestions are, of 
course, only drafts whose relevance requires fundamental work in the educational 
sciences. Nevertheless, they allow us to see that many ideas can still emerge from the 
study of Dewey’s educational philosophy, which, far from being outdated at present, 
can still open up unexplored methods for our systems of education.
Conclusion
In view of the evidence of the defended proposal, “Students must be educated about 
conflict in order to prepare them for future conflicts,” one may be surprised by the 
arguments set out in this article. However, it is by seriously considering Schutz’s and 
Niebuhr’s criticisms that the full extent and importance of the notion of conflict 
within Dewey’s thinking can be explored. Explicating the criticisms of two of his 
major detractors demonstrates that neither Dewey’s political philosophy nor his phi-
losophy of education can remain valid without the notion of conflict. Conflict can only 
be a valid pedagogical tool if it is understood as a political reality. At the same time, 
as a political reality, it can only be surpassed via compromise if children are educated 
about the possibility of conflict resolution. It is this interaction between politics and 
pedagogy that lies at the heart of this notion that the three uses of conflict in Dewey’s 
work exemplify. This is why skipping these steps would have been doubly damaging.
Indeed, in France, educational philosophers tend to view Dewey as a teacher 
of cooperation with optimistic and naive views regarding the attitude of children 
toward mutual assistance and solidarity. Nothing could be further from the truth, 
because this cooperation is not automatic for him and is always an attitude that 
must be produced, legitimized, and made necessary by the situation in the eyes of 
the child. Moreover, neglecting the importance of conflict is equivalent to turning 
the method of inquiry into a simple technique whose quality resides exclusively in 
its application. The inquiry in Dewey’s eyes is of value only because it mobilizes 
the intelligence necessary to resolve the conflict being presented. Without it, the 
dynamics of the inquiry become meaningless. During a time in which conflicts 
contaminate political reality and history, nothing seems more urgent than to explore 
Dewey’s work in order to forge a pedagogy that does not deny the difficulty nor the 
necessity of the quest for a compromise.
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